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A Framework for Non-Governmental Organisations in
International Diplomacy
Frank Vibert*
This comment on the role of Non-Governmental Organisations ("NGOs") in
international relations is divided into two parts. First, it addresses the main theme of
Kenneth Anderson's paper, and second, it looks at European attitudes on the subject.
I. THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

The main message of Professor Anderson's paper is that international NGOs
grossly exaggerate their claims of being representative of and providing a legitimate
expression of international civil society. On the contrary, Professor Anderson argues,
they threaten legitimate democratic expression. Thus, Professor Anderson concludes
that the Bush administration should take a much stronger line in asserting the voice of
democratic sovereign states, notably its own.
I agree with this message. What Professor Anderson's paper does not provide,
however, is a framework for dealing with NGOs. International NGOs are here to
stay, and a framework for understanding their activities is necessary. Similarly,
international rules of behaviour are here to stay, and it is inherent in such rules that
they constrain the role of sovereign states, particularly large states such as the United
States. For example, the rules for international "freer" trade have allowed small
countries to flourish, suggesting a more complicated relationship between
international rules, institutions, and sovereign states than Professor Anderson
concedes Thus, the aim of US policy should not be against rule-making as such, but
should insist on the right rules-rules that are consistent or compatible with the
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values to which the United States itself subscribes. Rather than opposing NGOs, the
United States should develop a framework within which they can be treated.
A. A TRANSACTION-COST APPROACH

One approach to constructing such a framework is to look at the subject in terms
of transaction costs. Some NGO activities raise the costs of international action, and
others lower them. For example, when NGOs perform as service-deliverers by
providing vaccination services, or as doers in the field by helping to dig wells, they
lower the cost of international action because they perform these services more
effectively than governments or official international organisations. Similarly, some
NGOs help inform international debate (as the American Enterprise Institute is doing
in this conference). This kind of activity can also reduce the cost of international
transactions because people gain a better idea of why something is or is not being done,
thereby reducing uncertainty. On the other hand, when NGOs advocate unreasoned
views (as Greenpeace sometimes does), or act as lobbyists for international resource
reallocation, they raise the costs of international transactions. Someone, somewhere
incurs the costs of rebutting unsubstantiated claims and examining the case for
resource reallocation.
Following this approach, an appropriate theoretical framework would encourage
those NGO actors and actions that lower the costs of international transactions,
including the costs of obtaining and enforcing the "right" rules of international
behaviour, and discourage those NGO actors and actions that raise the costs of
international transactions, including the costs of rule-making.
B. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS

There are a number of mechanisms that might provide the necessary mix of
incentives and disincentives.
First, greater room to operate and additional
encouragement could be given to the NGO deliverers and doers, particularly in
bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. Second, a more selective approach could be
taken towards international meetings in order to facilitate reasoned and responsible
dialogue. Large international jamborees of the sort espoused by UN organisations
should be discouraged (for example through budget control), while more cost-effective
ways of engaging reasoned NGO contributions should be encouraged. For example,
the World Bank has held meetings with private think-tanks involved with
development issues, and the European Council has set up an interactive web site for
debate ahead of the next Inter-Governmental Conference ("IGC") scheduled for 2004.
This is a way of having reasoned debate with those interested. Third, NGOs should
be under an obligation to observe standards of corporate governance, making it clear
whom and what they represent, and how they are funded and organised. In this
context, a number of countries would need to review their laws governing non-profit
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organisations and charities, so as to ensure the same kind of transparency and
disclosure from NGOs as is expected of profit-oriented public companies.
This transaction-cost framework for treating NGOs is not something that needs
to be unique to the NGO world. On the contrary, a transaction-cost approach can
provide a more general guide to the world of international regimes. There is a need to
avoid the proliferation of international rules and rule-makers, and to cut down on the
number of international organisations and poorly conceived rules. The policy focus
should instead be on preparing better rules that will be better enforced in the limited
areas where rule-making makes sense on a global basis. This cost-reduction approach
may also suggest the need for a greater investment in dispute resolution mechanisms,
including informal mechanisms which can be effective before disputes become
formalised, politicised, and expensive to clear up. For example, closer consultation
between the competition and trade regulation authorities of the EU and the United
States should head off the kind of inconsistencies which arose with the proposed
GE/Honeywell merger. Experience has shown that this kind of transboundary
communication is often successful in averting political disputes.!
II. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
A tougher US approach to international NGOs, rules, and organisations along
the lines outlined above is unlikely to be fully supported by European countries,
however. For a number of reasons, the role of international NGOs is likely to be
regarded in a more favourable light in Europe.
A. BRIDGING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

First, NGOs are seen to play a role within Europe which helps make up for what
is widely viewed to be a missing European public opinion. Information flows and
public opinion in Europe remain largely segmented along national divides. It is only
rarely, such as in the case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ("mad cow disease"),
or after a sudden hike of prices at the fuel pump, that public opinion crosses national
borders. Thus, NGOs tend to be seen as a desirable integrating force and as
contributors to building a demos.3 In this way, they are seen as closely linked to the
task of creating civil society. Furthermore, in the same way that NGOs are seen as
part of the answer to a democratic deficit inside the EU, NGOs are seen by extension
as part of the answer to the democratic deficit which exists alongside international
organisations and rule-making regimes.
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B. PRIVATE DIPLOMACY

Second, Europe perceives the disjunction between sovereign nation-states and
the world of international regimes in a more pronounced way than does the United
States. This is because most European states are small and feel powerless. When
organised politics do not connect domestic democratic sentiment with the world of
international regimes, NGOs have a greater opportunity to fill the gap, thereby
garnering greater sympathy for their efforts. The formation of the EU is itself a
reflection of the desire of European countries to play a larger role in international
affairs. Nevertheless, the EU is still in the process of development and does not yet
provide the kinds of democratic interconnections that are needed.
Unfortunately, it is also the case that the EU is defining for itself a more assertive
official role in terms of what is not the US position, rather than what the content
should be by normative standards. This creates a space for two diametrically opposed
types of NGOs-those with an anti-US agenda and those apprehensive about the
weakening of transatlantic ties. In either case, a valid space exists for NGOs to
practice private diplomacy or private lobbying and advocacy.
C. THE "Eco-SOCIAL MARKET"
Third, the prevailing view of the market in Europe is not that of the "free"
market but of the "eco-social market." Thus globalisation is usually presented as a
threat to the welfare capitalism of the EU. This means that Europeans have less
concern than Americans about the anti-market behaviour or green extremism of some
international NGOs.
D. TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONS

Fourth, the distinction, accepted by Professor Anderson, between international
treaty power and the powers conferred by domestic constitutions is not a distinction
that translates easily to the European context. The EU itself is founded upon a series
of treaties which have been-and still are-used to redefine the domestic
constitutional orders of democratic EU states. Moreover, the European Court of
Justice has interpreted the treaties as having constitutional significance." The treaty
route to obtaining constitutional changes has been preferred by Europe's political
leaders to the risks perceived in holding an overt constitutional debate. In addition,
the European Convention on Human Rights of the Council of Europe has been
incorporated into the law of all European countries, arguably blurring any distinction
between treaties and domestic constitutions. Indeed, the upcoming 2004 IGC will be

4.

See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights andFundamental Freedoms, 1996 ECR 1-1763, 1789 (Mar 28, 1996).

V0. z2NO. 2

..Af.rameworkfor 9on-§overnmentaf Organisationsin7nternationaf'Dipfomacj

the first occasion when EU leaders will address an explicitly constitutional agenda.
Although the full scope of the agenda is not yet decided, governments have already
agreed to consider issues such as the role of national parliaments and the division of
powers between the EU, the member states, and their regions.
Europe's leaders have recently been shocked by the violence of demonstrations in
Gothenburg and Genoa. Nevertheless, these differences in perspective mean that the
United States will have only weak support from Europe in creating a much more
robust framework for dealing with international NGOs. As in so many other areas of
international law, the United States will have to take the lead if it wants to place
NGOs within a more cost-effective system of global governance.
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